How water was gradually transformed from a common good into a tradeable commodity — concealed behind the language of sustainability and solidarity — Water as Blue Gold & Currency of Control. The water war has already begun — only the name is still missing.
Water is the new gold, just as data is today — but also the new weapon vector. It is not merely a raw material; it is one of the natural elements of planet Earth and the foundation of all life — every ecosystem, every harvest, every cell in every body — without it, everything dies.
Whoever controls water controls people, their health, the future, the ecosystem — everything. More control than fiat money has ever yielded. Droughts and floods are no longer merely feared — they are deployed. Scarcity is manufactured where it need not exist.
While the atmospheric cycle is being privatised, commercialised and manipulated, one source remains out of sight: Primary Water — the water that has nothing to do with rainfall, that is continuously produced deep within the earth, and that is precisely why it is systematically suppressed.
This timeline documents how we arrived here — this website offers a solution. There is hope.
1. Define water as an "economic good" — Dublin 1992
2. Lock the reversal path legally — GATS 1995, bilateral treaties
3. Use crisis as leverage — WEF, IMF/SAPs, Troika
4. Normalise through international institutions — WEF, FAO, UNECE, SDGs
5. Financialise completely — water rights, futures on Wall Street (2020)
Agenda-setters: World Bank · IMF · WTO · WEF · FAO · UNECE — write the rules, define the language.
Operators: Veolia · Suez · Bechtel · Thames Water · Biwater — collect profit, leave losses with the state.
Financiers: Goldman Sachs · BlackRock · Vanguard · JP Morgan · HSBC — build financial products, buy water rights.
Legitimisers: GWI · WWC · Global Water Forum — normalise market solutions as neutral science.
Under pressure: Greece · Portugal · Italy · Bolivia · Tanzania · Philippines · Ghana.
Water evolves from public service to financial asset. Goldman Sachs values the market at $316 bn (2013). BlackRock, Vanguard, JP Morgan build water rights portfolios. CME/Nasdaq launches water futures (2020). Prices determined by shareholder returns, not delivery costs. → Goldman Sachs 2013 · GWI 2009 · Wall Street 2020
Veolia and Suez control the water supply of hundreds of millions of people in 60+ countries, promoted by Goldman Sachs, present at the WEF and on the FAO list — despite documented tariff increases of 300%+ and failures on multiple continents. → Thatcher 1989 · Cochabamba 2000 · Goldman Sachs 2013 · FAO 2014
England (1989–1999): 11,000+ households disconnected. Bolivia (2000): bill rose to ¼ of the minimum wage. Worldwide, private companies control water for 909 million people — on average 59% more expensive than public management. Poor neighbourhoods are ignored as unprofitable. → Thatcher 1989 · Cochabamba 2000 · UN Human Right 2010
Whoever controls water controls people. The US–Israel Act (1996) links water technology to national security and private profit. Israeli companies export the model to Africa and Asia. The Nile, Mekong and Amazon are active flashpoints — water wars in slow motion. Countries become structurally dependent on the same technology provider and financier. → US–Israel 1996 · UNECE 2015 · FAO 2014
Through Structural Adjustment Programmes, the World Bank and IMF imposed water privatisation as a loan condition on dozens of countries. After demonstrable failure, only the language changed — from "privatisation" to "public-private partnership" — the structure remained identical. → Dublin 1992 · Cochabamba 2000 · WEF 2012 · UN Human Right 2010
Whether this is a coordinated agenda or the result of identical interests — the patterns are documented. Draw your own conclusions.
At school we learn exclusively about the atmospheric cycle — "natural sources" are mentioned but never their origin or inexhaustibility. Primary Water — continuously produced deep within the earth's crust — is systematically omitted. When Salzman published his book on this topic in 1960, nearly all copies were bought up by governments.
All the water we consume today comes from the atmospheric cycle — entirely in the hands of the same actors. Through geo-engineering, they create drought or floods on demand, thus manufacturing the scarcity that justifies privatisation. Gaddafi's GMMR project — the world's largest irrigation project, scheduled for completion in 2015 — was systematically destroyed in 2011, just before completion. New Scientist (2014): massive ocean beneath the earth's crust — see our blog.
15 CFR Part 908 requires weather modification to be reported to the NOAA. The White House published an official SRM report in 2023. A USAF document from 1996 describes weather control as a military strategy. Several US states banned it by decree. Official US patents for cloud seeding exist. In black and white. See light-blue timeline items.
Water is the foundation of everything that lives — 70% of the Earth's surface. Whoever controls the atmospheric cycle controls people, food, health and economies. Privatisation and atmospheric manipulation are two sides of the same story. The facts are documented. Draw your own conclusions.
Private companies would finance investments more efficiently than the state. Consumers would benefit through lower tariffs and better service.
Bills rose 40%+ above inflation. £57 bn in dividends paid out (1991–2019), debt from £0 to £48 bn. Thames Water nearly bankrupt in 2024. 300,000 illegal sewage discharges per year (2023).
The government wrote off £7.7 bn in debt, added £1.5 bn cash ("green dowry"), sold everything for just £5.6 bn. The taxpayer paid more than the proceeds. Ten regional water companies listed on the stock exchange — today owned by foreign investors and private equity.
More than 11,000 households disconnected for non-payment — documented in the Arte documentary Main basse sur l'eau (2018). Not banned until 1999 (Water Industry Act 1999). Mike Young — Australian economist (Harvard), the "père des marchés de l'eau" — developed the Australian system of tradeable water rights and has since advised the UN and several governments. His models underlie the California water futures (CME 2020). Not a lobbyist but a renowned academic — which makes it all the more telling that his "new story of water" treats market logic as self-evident.
Immediately promoted as a success model by the World Bank and IMF, which imposed it in the 1990s as a loan condition. The same companies — Suez (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux), Vivendi (now Veolia) and Thames Water — became the players that entered markets elsewhere through World Bank contracts.
Concrete failures directly traceable to this model: Argentina (Buenos Aires, Suez — cancelled 2006), Bolivia (Cochabamba, Bechtel — popular uprising 2000), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Biwater — cancelled 2005), Philippines (Manila, Maynilad — bankrupt 2003), Chile (privatised under Pinochet — never reversed). Everywhere the same pattern: tariff increases, underinvestment, social unrest.
500 experts from 100 countries present four principles for environmental protection, women's rights and participation of all citizens.
Water as economic good = tradeable product, like oil or grain. Used by the World Bank and IMF to impose privatisation as a loan condition.
Directly applied through Structural Adjustment Programmes in Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania and Bolivia. "Realistic water pricing" = market prices for citizens. "Enabling environment" = legislation enabling privatisation. Six months later submitted to the Rio Earth Summit as the basis for Agenda 21.
GATS creates a multilateral framework for liberalisation of services trade. Water distribution falls under CPC code 18000. The agreement would promote economic efficiency, foreign investment and better services.
The ratchet principle (Art. XXI): liberalisation can only advance, never retreat. Countries with GATS commitments are bound by market access (foreign private operators cannot be excluded) and national treatment (foreign operators must be treated equally to domestic public operators). GATS is legally enforceable through WTO dispute procedures — stronger than the UN human right to water (2010).
A government wishing to remunicipalise water after a failed privatisation risks a WTO complaint from the country of origin of the private operator. The damages claims upon defeat make re-nationalisation financially unviable for many countries. The same logic was used by Bechtel to sue Bolivia after Cochabamba (→ see 2000).
After Doha (2001), the EU sent secret request letters to more than 70 countries to open up their water sector. When these leaked in 2003 via the Polaris Institute, the systematic pressure became visible.
On 1 February 1996, the US and Israel signed an agreement for cooperation in energy research. Presented as scientific and economic cooperation between allies, with subsidies for water desalination, water purification and water reuse.
The law recognises Israel as a "strategic partner in water technology" and links water desalination and purification to national security interests. "For-profit business entities" are explicitly designated as beneficiaries of government subsidies — profits are private, the technology is not public property.
The law provides subsidies for "improvement of energy efficiency and the overall performance of water technologies through research and development in water desalination, wastewater treatment and reclamation." Whoever owns the desalination technology controls the water supply in regions without freshwater.
"Strategic partner in water technology" — water not as a human right, but as a strategic asset. "Analysis of emerging geopolitical implications, crises and threats from foreign natural resource and energy acquisitions" — whoever controls water sources is openly regarded as a geopolitical threat.
The model: public money develops the technology → private companies become owners → they export it as a market product to water-scarce regions → governments become dependent on the technology provider. IDE Technologies and Mekorot subsequently became active in Africa, India and Latin America — with knowledge built with public funds.
Four years after Dublin (1992), a bilateral structure is created at legislative level that links water technology to national security, private profit and geopolitical strategy. It is the first time a national law links the commercialisation of water technology to state subsidies and geopolitical strategy — the model that was subsequently copied worldwide.
The document describes how the US aims to achieve full weather control by 2025 as a strategic military advantage. Scenarios: targeted precipitation, drought, fog and storms on demand — precisely deployed above target areas.
If drought and floods can be artificially created, then "water scarcity" is not a natural problem but a political choice. Water scarcity justifies privatisation — see Dublin 1992 and Water 2025 (2003).
The 51-page report was written by seven USAF officers as a future study for 2025. It describes cloud seeding, steering precipitation and amplifying or weakening storms. It is still available today on the official website of the Defence Technical Information Center (DTIC) and is fully downloadable.
15 CFR Part 908 — federal regulation that mandatorily registers and reports weather modification activities in the US to the NOAA. It exists, it is reported, and there are official US patents for cloud seeding and related techniques. Multiple US states have banned geo-engineering on their territory by decree — because they recognised the risks.
The IMF made privatisation of SEMAPA a condition of a $138 M loan. Bechtel won the contract. Promise: modernisation, expansion to poor neighbourhoods, efficient management.
Water bills rose to ¼ of the minimum wage. Law 2029 even banned collecting rainwater without Bechtel's permission. Neighbourhood committees managing their own water wells were criminalised.
January 2000: the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida is founded — farmers' organisations, trade unions and residents' committees form an alliance. Cochabamba is brought to a standstill. April 2000: state of emergency, army deployed. On 8 April, Víctor Hugo Daza (17) is shot dead. On 10 April, Bechtel withdraws. SEMAPA returns to public management.
Bechtel claimed $50 M via ICSID (World Bank tribunal) based on a Dutch-Bolivian investment treaty — an American company through a European construction, beyond democratic reach. After international campaigns, Bechtel withdrew in 2006 without compensation. But the precedent remained: investment treaties (→ see GATS 1995) can make privatisation irreversible.
Cochabamba demonstrated three things: (1) IMF privatisation hits the poorest hardest, (2) popular uprising can reverse it, (3) investment treaties bypass democracy. The same pattern subsequently repeated itself on multiple continents (→ see 1989: Thatcher, export model).
Presentation by NASA's chief scientist to DARPA, CIA, DIA and dozens of defence agencies on future threats and technologies.
Water is explicitly described as an attack target and as a "serious problem" requiring technological solutions — whoever owns that technology controls water production.
Water contamination via drones as one of the cheapest ways to shut down a country. Water here is not a human right — it is a strategic vulnerability.
This is an internal planning document, not official policy. The provenance is documented but the context is not independently verifiable. It deserves mention because of the military dimension of water control, but should be read with appropriate critical distance.
Population growth, drought and ageing infrastructure as causes. "Doing nothing is an option, but only if we are willing to accept the drastic consequences."
Public water supply is unsustainable, market forces are the solution. Water is traded, rented and leased between competing users — with the government as facilitator of private deals.
The document contains an official map of the US with zones marked as "Conflict Potential — Highly Likely." By framing water scarcity as imminent conflict between neighbours, farmers and cities, urgency is created that justifies sweeping policy changes — including privatisation.
"Water banks and markets" — farmers sell/rent water rights to cities; the market price determines who gets water. "Remove Institutional Barriers" — repeal legal obstacles to water trading. "Aging infrastructure" — ageing pipes as an argument for private investment. It dovetails seamlessly with Dublin 1992: water is gradually transformed from public infrastructure into a tradeable asset.
Comprehensive report on 1,000 water utilities, mergers, investment outlook 2009–2016. Intended for "everyone with a business interest in the water industry."
Detailed guide to acquiring public water utilities. Identifies obstacles and strategies to overcome resistance. Water as "low risk, long term monopoly."
Statements by senior executives of water companies themselves. The appeal is crystal clear: everyone must take water, there is no alternative, and demand will never fall. A monopoly on a basic necessity.
"The four year election cycle for decision makers is a major obstacle" — elections slow down private deals. "Presenting a PPP as a lease can make it more palatable to the community" — deliberate language to break resistance. "The credit crunch could see increased opportunities for the private sector" — the 2008 financial crisis as an opportunity: distressed municipalities are more vulnerable. Total market: $113 bn/year, expected growth 15% per year.
The WWC presents itself as an independent international organisation. President Fauchon met UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, trained parliamentarians worldwide and prepared the 6th World Water Forum.
Founded (1996) with Suez Environnement as the driving force. Members: Veolia Eau, Sinohydro, SNC-Lavalin, Aguas de Portugal and dozens of other commercial water parties. Exactly the parties that profit from privatisation — and they steer the "independent" advice to governments and the UN.
The report lists new members without embarrassment: Veolia Eau (world's largest private water concession company), SNC-Lavalin International (Canadian privatisation consortium), Sinohydro Group (Chinese state company for mega-dams). Regular members: Suez, GDF, the World Bank and national water management authorities.
In 2010: meeting with Ban Ki-moon, "Water Legislation Helpdesk" to steer legislation in favour of the private sector, pavilion at World Expo Shanghai (500,000 visitors), media appearances on Al Jazeera, Financial Times, BBC.
After the UN recognition (28 July 2010), the WWC president immediately asked to clarify "who is responsible" for implementation — classic privatisation logic: once water is a right, the state can "outsource" it to private operators who "deliver" it at market price.
The WWC actively lobbied at COP15 (Copenhagen) and COP16 (Cancún) to include "water infrastructure investments" in climate agreements. Objective: channel climate finance towards private water projects by labelling them as "climate adaptation."
President Fauchon visited the Chinese Vice-Premier, the South Korean Prime Minister, the Singaporean Water Minister, Ugandan water authorities, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the Pure Water Forum in Moscow. Systematic lobbying of heads of state by an organisation funded by private water companies.
Safe drinking water and sanitation are essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human rights.
That same year the ECB sends letters to Greece and Portugal: sell your water utilities as a condition for emergency loans. A human right adopted in the morning, bargained away in the evening.
Of 192 member states, 122 voted in favour. No country voted explicitly against, but 41 countries abstained — including the US, UK, Canada and Australia: the countries that had privatised the water of the poorest via Bechtel, and that lobbied most aggressively via GATS for the opening of water markets.
Resolution 64/292 is non-binding: no country can be sanctioned for violations. A state can recognise the right to water and simultaneously impose privatisation through IMF conditions — with no international legal mechanism to prevent this. This stands in stark contrast to GATS (1995), which is enforceable through WTO dispute procedures.
28 July — UN recognises water as a human right. 5 August — ECB sends letter to Italy with privatisation demand. October — IMF and EC impose first memorandum on Greece with privatisation as a condition. Greece was forced to sell EYDAP (Athens) and EYATH (Thessaloniki). Portugal: Águas de Portugal partially privatised. Italy resisted thanks to the 2011 referendum (95.8% against) and intervention by the Constitutional Court in 2012.
2,600 leaders develop new models. Water as "water-food-energy nexus" requiring expert guidance. WRG as "public-private-civil society cooperation model."
WRG housed at the IFC — the commercial arm of the World Bank. Coca-Cola: $2 M seed capital. Brabeck-Letmathe (Nestlé) at the table. The report uses "chronic mismanagement" to legitimise private steering — while that mismanagement was often the result of earlier World Bank-imposed austerity measures.
The WRG is housed at the IFC — not a neutral host but the commercial arm that mobilises private capital for markets in developing countries. Guinea's Finance Minister immediately signed a cooperation agreement. An MoU was also signed with the Inter-American Development Bank. This is the infrastructure for a global corporate grip on water.
Translation: governments have managed water poorly, so the private sector must take over. Not mentioned: in many countries that "mismanagement" was the result of World Bank austerity conditions.
Not democratic legislation, but an informal network of "stakeholders" — including companies — that decides on water.
Chairman of Nestlé, present at the Open Forum Davos 2012. The same man who publicly stated that water as a human right is "an extreme view." At Davos 2012, at the table helping to design global water policy.
Four years after WEF 2012, the WEF published a video with eight "predictions" for 2030 — including the complete abolition of private property. The video was viewed millions of times and subsequently removed after massive criticism. The statement sums up what the timeline documents: the shift from common ownership to controlled access.
The WEF popularises the "water-food-energy nexus" — bundling three sectors so that private investment in all three is justified as "necessary." The recommendation: abolish subsidies, market prices that reflect "true costs." For poor households: higher water bills.
Co-chairs: top managers of Citi, Unilever, Shell, Facebook. Strategic partners: BP, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Nestlé, GDF SUEZ (parent of Suez Environnement). The same players that profit from water privatisation — writing the policy.
The Global Markets Institute presents itself as a public policy research unit providing "high-level advisory services to policymakers, regulators and investors around the world" on water scarcity and investment opportunities.
Goldman Sachs is not a neutral think tank but an investment bank that itself invests in water infrastructure. The report describes water as a $316 bn market, calls subsidies an "obstacle to efficiency," promotes Veolia by name, and advocates market prices — policy that raises the profits of companies in which Goldman holds stakes.
Companies promoted by name: Veolia (France) and Miya (Israel) as "pure water specialists," General Electric (US) and Doosan (South Korea). Veolia — the same company that imposed 300%+ tariff increases in Cochabamba.
Agricultural water costs on average $0.10/m³, household $0.60–$3.00/m³. What is not mentioned: low prices are in developing countries the only way poor households can access water. "Efficiency" via market prices = the poorest are cut off.
The same bank that: (1) partly responsible for the 2008 crisis, (2) helped Greece conceal debt through derivatives, after which the country was forced to sell public services, and (3) now acts as a "neutral" water adviser. The structure: GS advises governments → governments liberalise → GS invests → profits flow back. Nowhere flagged as a conflict of interest.
The report promotes "virtual water" — water-scarce countries must import food rather than produce it themselves. The same logic used by the IMF to dismantle self-sufficient agriculture in favour of export crops. Who benefits? Large agro-exporters and Goldman Sachs itself, active in commodity trading.
Coca-Cola as a "water conservation company" — while it pumped a groundwater source dry in Plachimada (Kerala). Syngenta as "water-saving" — one of the largest pesticide producers. By presenting major polluters as water managers, the narrative is created that the private sector is the solution. This is the "social licence" function of the report.
ECB and EU ask Greece, Portugal and Italy to sell their water utilities. Expected benefit: smaller deficits, better performance through private efficiency and investment.
Author Peeroo (Univ. Paris 1) documents: privatisation leads to tariff increases, underinvestment, refusal to extend networks to poor neighbourhoods. Documented failures in Buenos Aires, Cochabamba and Dar es Salaam.
The "Troika" — ECB, IMF and European Commission — set privatisation of water utilities explicitly as loan conditions. This is not a policy suggestion but an enforceable contractual condition: whoever wants the loan must sell their water. The mechanism: countries in distress have no negotiating position. The crisis — partly caused by speculation from the same banks — is used as leverage. Naomi Klein calls this the "shock doctrine."
June 2011: referendum — 96% vote against privatisation (54% turnout). August 2011: ECB President Draghi sends memo to the Berlusconi government with an explicit demand that water privatisation proceed regardless. Only in July 2012 does the Constitutional Court declare this constitutionally invalid.
Portugal: civic movement "Água é de todos", 40,000 signatures against the water sale. Spain: Indignado movements with colour-coded protest waves — blue for water. Madrid: mass demonstration against the sale of 49% of Canal de Isabel II.
Peeroo analyses through the framework of Nobel Prize winner Williamson: privatisation requires a regulatory agency (costly to set up in times of crisis), while technocratically imposed top-down reforms actually reduce the chances of success. Conclusion: public water management is possible without ruining budgets — researchers should study successful public models rather than repeating failed privatisation models. The growing trend of "remunicipalisation" (Paris, Berlin, Hamilton) is ignored by the Troika.
Agriculture uses 70% of global freshwater. The food chain consumes 30% of global energy. 60% more food production is needed by 2050. FAO wants to contribute to integrated management through "evidence, scenarios and multi-stakeholder dialogue."
The same concept launched by the WEF in 2012 (with Shell, Goldman Sachs, Coca-Cola as funders) now receives UN legitimacy. By bundling three vital sectors, the private sector is automatically brought in — no government can finance all three simultaneously. Co-financed by the OPEC Fund.
2011 — Bonn Nexus Conference (academic). 2012 — WEF Davos adopts with corporate funding. 2013 — Goldman Sachs applies in water market report. 2014 — FAO institutionalises as UN policy. 2015 — incorporated in SDGs. Each step more legitimacy, less room for alternatives. "Multi-stakeholder dialogue" = the private sector structurally at the table.
The document states that energy subsidies for irrigation pumps "can distort benefits and costs" — in parallel with Goldman Sachs (2013) and WEF (2012). What is missing: for millions of small farmers in developing countries, subsidised energy and water are the only way to produce anything at all. Without subsidies, they are priced out of the market in favour of large agro-operators.
Municipalities may sell or lease water or sewer assets to private parties if an "emergency" exists — e.g. environmental problems, infrastructure damage or insufficient pressure. A mayor certifies the emergency; a procurement procedure follows without a public vote.
A popular referendum is bypassed once an "emergency" is certified — by the same politician who wants the sale. Only if 15% of voters submit a petition within 20 days does a referendum follow. If not: the transfer proceeds. Citizens are sidelined.
The law lists six cases constituting an emergency — including vague criteria such as "insufficient pressure" or "capacity problems." Exactly the same logic as the IMF shock doctrine: create or designate a crisis → bypass democratic procedures → normalise private takeover. Not internationally, but through state legislation — from within democracy.
In the same year Goldman Sachs values the water market at $316 bn, the FAO institutionalises the WEF nexus frame, and the Troika forces Greece and Portugal to sell their water. New Jersey S2412 shows that the privatisation logic works not only internationally but also becomes deeply embedded in national and state law.
Nexus assessments in three basins (Alazani/Ganykh, Sava, Syr Darya) show how water, energy, food and ecosystems are intertwined. Goal: better governance, efficiency and sustainable cooperation.
The concept travels from WEF Davos (2012, funded by Shell, Goldman Sachs, Coca-Cola) via FAO (2014) to UNECE treaty law (2015). Through the Water Convention now a binding part of international water law. That same year: SDGs with nexus in goals 2, 6, 7 and 15.
Syr Darya (Central Asia) — one of the most contested water sources in the world, where World Bank and IMF recommend water market reforms. Sava (South-East Europe) — EU accession with privatisation conditions. Alazani/Ganykh (Caucasus) — transition countries with World Bank/EBRD support.
Developed with funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). "Multi-stakeholder dialogues" bring sector ministries together — private operators are present via "bilateral development partners." Under "instruments" are explicitly included cost recovery, efficiency pricing and trading of water rights — exactly the same measures as Goldman Sachs (2013) and FAO (2014).
Every national water governance discussion after 2015 runs through this frame. The concept launched in 2012 by the WEF with corporate funding is three years later binding for all 193 UN member states as part of SDG reporting.
The Nasdaq Veles California Water Index (NQH2O) as a "risk management instrument" for farmers and municipalities. The index tracks the price of water rights in California — the largest water market in the US. Goal: price certainty and transparency.
Water futures allow speculators to bet on water prices without ever using or owning water. The CFTC (exchange regulator) only monitors above 10,000+ contracts — below that it flies entirely under the radar, opening the door to market manipulation and speculation that can drive up water prices.
The NQH2O index was developed in 2018 by Veles Water Ltd (British water data company) with WestWater Research. The index measures spot prices of water rights in the five largest Californian water markets. On 7 December 2020, CME Group launched the first official water futures contracts. Price rose from ~$489 to ~$936/acre-foot in less than a year (+91%). Eight quarterly contracts quoted simultaneously — speculative positions far into the future are possible.
Announcement 27 October 2020, launch 7 December — in the midst of the second coronavirus wave, maximum public distraction. UN Special Rapporteur Pedro Arrojo-Agudo condemned it explicitly:
Profit: water rights holders in California who sell their rights at higher prices, investment funds with water rights portfolios, and financial institutions that facilitate the trade. Pay: small farmers, municipalities and households who must buy water at the rising market price. According to Food & Water Watch, private companies already control the water supply of 909 million people — at on average 59% higher tariffs than public companies.
Water futures would provide price certainty for farmers and municipalities. Private party financing would close the "financing gap" in water infrastructure where public budgets fall short.
Rapporteur Arrojo-Agudo documents: water futures follow exactly the same speculative dynamics as food futures that in 2008 pushed 130–150 million people into extreme poverty. Private water financing makes infrastructure more expensive and puts short-term profit above human rights.
In 2008, speculative investments in food futures caused maize prices to triple, wheat +127%, rice +170%. The World Bank counted 130–150 million newly extremely poor. Arrojo-Agudo draws the direct parallel: the same arguments that at the time legitimised speculation on food are today used for water. Water futures were launched in 2020 — one year after the publication of this report. The warning was ignored.
The report documents how Macquarie Bank acquired Thames Water in 2006 — £2.8 bn borrowed for a £5.1 bn purchase. The company's debts rose explosively, maintenance deteriorated, but shareholder returns soared. When sold in 2017, Macquarie left behind a debt load and the UK's highest tariffs for 15 million users.
Arrojo-Agudo called on States to: ban water futures, prioritise public financing for SDG 6, and explicitly recognise water as a human right in binding legislation. None of these recommendations were translated into mandatory international law. Two years later, the UN Water Conference 2023 recognised the private sector as a full "stakeholder" — the opposite of what this report requested.
Co-organised by the Netherlands and Tajikistan. 6,000+ participants. 700+ voluntary pledges. SDG 6 is far behind: only 15% on track. The conference was meant to send the urgent signal that water belongs at the top of the political agenda.
Water Action Agenda: legally entirely non-binding, no commitment enforceable. Large private operators, investment funds and technology companies present as official "stakeholders." Critics from Corporate Accountability, Food & Water Watch and TNI documented how technological and market solutions took centre stage, while structural causes remained off the programme.
The previous conference: Mar del Plata, 1977. In those 46 years, Dublin (1992), GATS (1995), World Bank pressure and the SDG nexus frame (2015) were all adopted — without the formal UN water conference framework. It is telling that the 2023 conference took place in the same year that water futures entered their third year.
A significant portion came from private companies: Nestlé, Veolia, Suez, HSBC. Pledges on "water efficiency" and "water stress reduction" — not audited, no deadlines with sanctions, no independent verification.
Water rights organisations and trade unions argued for a binding international water treaty — comparable to the Paris Climate Agreement. This proposal was not put on the agenda. The tension is structural: the same UN member states are bound through GATS by obligations that facilitate privatisation, and through the SDGs by a nexus framework that centralises market solutions. A binding water treaty does not fit into that system.
SRM would offset warming by reflecting sunlight via particles in the stratosphere. The White House report was ordered by Congress and presents SRM as a serious policy option for climate change.
By reducing sunlight, evaporation, precipitation and the entire atmospheric water cycle are affected. Aerosols in the stratosphere pollute rainwater — and therefore all the water that subsequently enters our soil, rivers and tap water.
Bill Gates funds through Harvard the SCoPEx experiment — spraying calcium carbonate and sulphur particles into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight. Gates is also one of the largest private agricultural landowners in the US and an investor in water companies and water filtration technology. The same person who wants to reduce sunlight invests in the technology that must subsequently purify polluted water.
In April 2024, more rain fell in Dubai in one day than in an entire year — unprecedented flooding. UAE authorities confirmed that cloud seeding operations were active during the period. International experts raised the question: did geo-engineering cause or worsen the floods? An official conclusive answer was not forthcoming. The incident demonstrates what the 1996 USAF document already described: extreme precipitation is manufacturable.
If droughts and floods can be created — and if the atmospheric cycle is the only recognised water source — then the same actors who privatise water also hold the key to the tap. Create scarcity = create demand = create market. Primary Water — the inexhaustible source deep in the earth's crust — does not fit this model. Hence the silence.
The revision fits within the broader "Better Regulation" agenda of the Von der Leyen Commission. Objective: reduce regulatory burden on farmers and industry, administrative simplification, adaptation to climate realities.
Environmental organisations (including WWF, European Environmental Bureau) establish: the revision weakens good-status standards for water bodies, lowers the bar for chemical contamination, and gives industrial actors more room to obtain exemptions. The WFD was the cornerstone of European water law.
The WFD obliged all EU member states to bring all water bodies to "good status" by 2015 (later 2027) — ecologically and chemically. Only 40% of European water bodies currently meet that standard. Instead of enforcing more strictly, the Commission now chooses to relax the standard itself.
The logic is familiar: set a standard, let enforcement lag, declare the standard "unrealistic" and scrap it. At the same time the market for water treatment and purification grows — a market that grows precisely as water quality deteriorates. The same actors lobbying for looser standards invest in the technology that must subsequently treat polluted water.
In the same year the EU weakens its own water law, the White House SRM reports, the NJ privatisation legislation and the Wall Street futures are running as fully operational instruments. The protection of water as a public good is simultaneously being dismantled at legislative, financial and atmospheric level.
The report Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond Our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era introduces water bankruptcy as a condition defined by two factors: insolvency (withdrawing more than is replenished) and irreversibility (loss of lakes, wetlands and aquifers that cannot be undone).
The language shift from "crisis" to "bankruptcy" is not innocent. Crisis implies a temporary shock with recovery. Bankruptcy implies irreversibility — and irreversibility raises the price. Scarcer water = higher returns for Wall Street futures (→ 2020) and investment funds (→ Goldman Sachs 2013).
Over 50% of large lakes worldwide have shrunk since 1990. Some 35% of natural wetlands have been lost since 1970. Around 4 billion people experience severe water scarcity at least one month per year. Drought damage costs $307 billion annually. 75% of the global population lives in water-insecure countries.
While the UN declares "bankruptcy", water restoration pioneers worldwide prove the opposite — not with billion-dollar technology, but with knowledge of the natural water cycle:
Rajendra Singh (India) — the "Waterman of India". Built over 11,000 johads — traditional earthen dams that capture rainwater and let it infiltrate the soil — together with village communities. Result: 5 dried-up rivers (Arvari, Ruparel, Sarsa, Bhagani, Jahajwali) revived after 60 years of drought. Groundwater table +6 meters, forest cover +33%, over 1,000 villages provided with water again. Stockholm Water Prize 2015.
Sepp Holzer (Austria) — the "rebel farmer". Transformed his mountain farm Krameterhof at 1,500m altitude into a self-sustaining ecosystem with 72 ponds, food forests and aquaculture — without irrigation, fertilizer or pesticides. His water retention landscapes capture rainwater and create microclimates. Advises globally on restoring dry landscapes (Spain, Portugal, USA).
Zach Weiss (USA) — founder of Elemental Ecosystems. Designs water retention landscapes that restore dry areas by keeping rainwater in the soil rather than letting it run off. Transforms desert areas into productive ecosystems.
Raleigh Latham (USA) — regenerative agriculture pioneer. Restores dry, degraded land into food forests through water retention, soil cover and mimicking natural hydrological cycles.
In 2014, an international team led by Graham Pearson (University of Alberta) published in Nature the first terrestrial evidence of the mineral ringwoodite — found in a diamond from Brazil, originating from ~500 km depth. The mineral contains 1.5% water as hydroxide ions. The researchers estimate that the mantle transition zone (410–660 km deep) could hold as much water as all the world's oceans combined. This is the same zone described in primary water theory as the source of juvenile water.
Every step has made the next possible. Dublin provided the legal language. GATS made reversal costly. The World Bank provided the leverage. The investment industry provided the capital. The climate and SDG agenda provided the new legitimacy. Wall Street provided the financial instrument. And atmospheric manipulation provides the scarcity that keeps the market alive. Water wars are not fought with weapons — but with laws, markets and weather manipulation.
The moments when this pattern was broken — Cochabamba 2000, the Italian referendum 2011, the remunicipalisation of Paris, the 235+ municipalities that took back their water — did not come from above. They came from citizens who refused to give up their water.
The stories behind the timeline — documented on film.
Jérôme Fritel · Arte · 2018 · 90 min
International investigation into the financialization of water. Follows Goldman Sachs, HSBC and water markets across Australia, California and Europe. Shows how 11,000 disconnected households in England were the start of a global trend.
→ Thatcher 1989 · Goldman Sachs 2013 · Wall Street 2020
▶ YouTube (free) ↗Sam Bozzo · 2008 · 90 min
Based on Maude Barlow's book. Comprehensive analysis of how corporations, investors and governments battle for control of water. From mining to pollution to wetland destruction — and the citizens fighting back.
→ Dublin 1992 · GATS 1995 · Cochabamba 2000
▶ YouTube (free) ↗Irena Salina · 2008 · 84 min
Award-winning documentary on the rise of a global water cartel. Interviews with scientists and activists reveal the political and ecological consequences of privatization — from Bolivia to India to the US.
→ World Bank · Cochabamba 2000 · GWI 2009
▶ YouTube (free) ↗Erwin Wagenhofer · 2005 · 96 min
Documentary on the global food industry. Contains the infamous interview with Nestlé CEO Peter Brabeck-Letmathe: "The view that water is a human right is an extreme position."
→ WEF Davos 2012 · Brabeck quote
▶ YouTube (free) ↗Icíar Bollaín · 2010 · 104 min · Feature film
Feature film about a film crew in Bolivia, caught in the middle of the Cochabamba Water War. Interweaves the colonial history of water plunder with the modern fight against Bechtel.
→ Cochabamba 2000
▶ YouTube (free) ↗Alan Snitow & Deborah Kaufman · 2004 · 62 min
Examines water conflicts in Bolivia, India and Stockton (California). Shows how resistance to privatization forges unexpected coalitions — across political lines.
→ Cochabamba 2000 · World Bank
IMDb ↗True Vision · BBC · 2006 · 75 min
BBC documentary on the human tragedies behind water privatization. Personal stories from communities where water became a luxury product.
→ Thatcher 1989 · Veolia/Suez duopoly
▶ Watch free ↗Stephanie Soechtig · 2009 · 76 min
Investigates the bottled water industry: how Nestlé, Coca-Cola and Pepsi privatize public water sources without adequate regulation.
→ FAO 2014 · Nestlé/Plachimada
▶ Tubi (free) ↗Muireann de Barra · 2012 · 50 min
El Alto, Bolivia: a poor mountain city where water was privatized as a World Bank condition. Suez subsidiary Aguas del Illimani took over — citizens fought back. Told without narration, solely through the voices of residents.
→ Cochabamba 2000 · World Bank/IMF
▶ YouTube (free) ↗